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Abstract 
This paper explores how an environmental tax reform impacts pollution, economic 
growth and welfare in an endogenous growth model with pre-existing tax distortions. 
We find that a shift in the tax mix away from output taxes towards pollution taxes 
may raise economic growth through two channels. The first channel is an en- 
vironmental production externality, which determines :he positive effect of lower 
aggregate pollution on the productivity of capital. The second channel is a shift in the 
tax burden away from the net return on investment towards profits. The paper also 
shows that the optimal tax on pollution may exceed its Pigovian level if tax-shifting 
towards profits is large and production externalities are important. 
Keywords: Environmental externalities; Economic growth; Double dividend; Second 
best; Pollution taxes 
JEL classification: H23; O41; Q28 
1. Introduction 
The l ink between environmental  policy and economic performance is a 
controversial  issue. Some people argue that society faces a trade-off 
between economic growth and a better  quality of the environment.  Others,  
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in contrast, maintain that a more ambitious environmental policy is a 
necessary condition for sustainable conomic growth. In this connection, 
environmental taxes seem to be a particularly attractive instrument to 
enhance nvironmental quality without seriously damaging rowth pros- 
pects. In particular, by increasing taxes on dirty activities and using the 
proceeds to cut distortionaly taxes on income, governments may be able to 
reap a 'double dividend,' namely, not only a cleaner environment but also a 
less distonionary tax system, thereby stimulating economic growth. 
This paper extends the literature on environmental tax reform in two 
directions. First, the analytical iterature has thus far explored the double 
dividend issue only in a static framework (see e.g. Ulph (1992), Bovenberg 
and De Mooij (199nab), Bovenberg and Van der Pioeg (1994ab), Oates 
(1995), Parry (1995) and Schfb (1994)). Numerical analyses have employed 
an intertemporal framework with exogenous growth (see e.g. Goulder 
(1995a) and Proost and Van Regemorter (1995)). We, in contrast, employ a 
dynamic model of endogenous growth, which builds on the endogenous 
growth model of Barro (1990), to analytically explore the link between 
environmental externalities and distortionary income taxes, which reduce 
growth below its first-best level. 
A second contribution of the paper is to model the environment as a 
public production factor by incorporating the positive effects of a high 
quality of the environment on the productivity of private inputs into 
production. Empirical evidence suggests that pollution causes serious 
productivity losses both in industrialized countries (see, e.g., Alfsen, 
Brendemoen and Glomsr~l (1992), Brendemoen and Vennemo (1994), and 
Ballard and Medema (1993)) and in developing countries (see e.g. Van 
Ewijk and Van Wijnbergen (1995)). Previous analyses of the double-divi- 
dend issue have abstracted from externalities affecting production by 
modelling the environment asa public consumption good. We show that the 
incorporation of production externalities makes a double dividend more 
likely. 
Our paper is also closely related to the literature on pollution and 
long-term growth (see e.g. Bovenberg and Smulders (1995), Den Butter and 
Hofkes (1993), Gradus and Smulders (1993), and Ligthart and Van der 
Ploeg (1993)). This literature focuses on optimal environmental policies and 
explores how the social optimum can be sustained in a decentralized 
economy. Our analysis departs from this first-best world in two major ways. 
First, we explore the consequences of a reform of the tax system, starting 
from an initial equilibrium that is not necessarily optimal. Second, in 
addition to market failures associated with environmental externalities, we 
allow for tax distortions due to the absence of lump-sum taxation. Hence, 
the interaction between environmental externalities and distortionary taxes 
is explored in a second-best world. In this connection, not only do we 
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investigate the consequences of an environmental tax reform but we also 
show how, in the presence of distortionary taxes, the optimal environmen~l 
tax deviates frota the Pigovian tax. 
Whether an environmental tax reform produces a second, non-environ- 
mental dividend in addition to the boost of environmental quality depends 
on how such a reform impacts the growth rate. In particular, by driving a 
wedge between the marginal social costs and benefits of capital accumula- 
tion, distortionary income taxes reduce economic growth below its first-hest 
level. Accordingly, a reform that boosts growth alleviates the deadweight 
loss from the d.;,stortionary income tax. In this way, an environmental tax 
reform may yield a double dividend, i.e. not only an increase in welfare 
from environmental menities but also ~a increase in welfare from private 
commodities (so-called private welfare) t. 
We find that an environmental tax reform harms growth, and hence 
private welfare, if two conditions are met. First, the positive externality of a 
better environmental quality on productivity should he small compared to 
the production elasticity of pollution as a rival input into production. 
Second, substitution between pollution and other inputs should he rather 
easy. If these two conditions are met, the government faces a trade-off 
between, on the one hand, environmental care and, on the other hand, 
economic growth and private welfare. If substitution between pollution and 
other inputs is difficult, pollution taxes are less powerful in cutting pollution. 
At the same time, however, they are a more effective device to tax the 
quasi-rents from pollution, tl~,ereby generating revenues to reduce the 
distortionary tax on output. Accordingly, an environmental tax reform may 
raise growth and thus private welfare by enhancing the efficiency of the tax 
system as a revenue-raising device. A double dividend may emerge also if 
the production externality is relatively powerful. 
In a second-best world with distortionary taxes, the optimal environmen- 
tal tax generally deviates from the Pigovian tax. We show that the optimal 
environmental tax lies below the Pigovian level if substitution between 
pollution and capital is relatively easy. However, if substitution is mote 
difficult, the optimal pollution tax may exceed the Pigovian level. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
model. Section 3 explores the effects of pollution taxes on growth, en- 
vironmental quality and welfare for the case that the substitution elasticity 
t Goulder (1995b) provides a storey of the theoretical nd empirical double dividend 
literature. Our definition of the double dividend (i.e. increases in both environmental end 
private welfare) corresponds to Cioulder's concept of the 'strong" version of the double 
dividend. According to Goulder's terminology, a "weak' double dividend implies that returning 
tax revenues through cuts in distortionary taxes leads to higher welfare compared to recycling 
these revenues through lower lump-sum taxes. 
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between capital and pollution equals unity. The case with small substitution 
possibilities between capital and pollution is investigated in section 4. 
Finally, section 5 concludes. 
2, The model 
In endogenous growth models, man-made commodities grow at endogen- 
ous growth rates while other inputs are constant. In our model, growth in 
output is sustainable because it is consistent with a fixed level of en- 
vironmental quality.-" indeed, after a policy shock, the economy immediately 
moves towards a so-called balanced growth path on which all man-made 
goods grow at the same rate while natural variables, including the quality of 
the environment, remain at a constant level. Transitional dynamics in the 
ratios between the man-made variables are absent because the model 
includes only one type of asset, namely capital. 
Balanced, sustainable growth should be both feasible and optimal. For 
growth to be feasible, the production function must meet the so-called 'core" 
property (see Rebeio (199!)) according to which capital is produced with a 
constant-returns technology in man-made inputs. Moreover, for the natural 
inputs to play a non-trivial role in the long run, various substitution 
elasticities must be unity. The requirement that balanced growth with a 
constant level of environmental quality not only be feasible but also optimal 
imposes restrictions on the utility function (see below). The rest of this 
section presents the model in more detail. The model equations are 
contained in table 1. Notation is explained at the end of the table. 
Table 1 
The model in levels 
Firms 
Production function 
v = f|m(K, s), n(A, P)IE ° 
where n(A, P) = AP ~ 
Firm Value 
v= f ne  "at 
o 
(I.1) 
(i.2) 
2 In most endogenous growth models, the inputs that are not man-made take the form of raw 
labor. In our model, howevet, hese inputs are supplied by nature. For another endogenous 
growth model in which growth of output is sustainable, i.e. consistent with a constant level of 
environmental quafity, see Gradus and Smulders (1993). 
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Dividends 
D = (i  - L )Y -  (I - L )A  - T~P- i (1.3) 
Investment 
t ~ ,~ (! .4)  
Profits 
W= D + I -  rK ( ! .5 )  
First-Order Conditions 
OY 
(1 - T , )~ = (1 - L )  (1.6) 
OY 
( l -  L ) -~= r , , ~t.7) 
aY 
(1 - T,.)~-~=r (L8)  
Households 
Utility 
= i 
¢ I cE  ] . . ,  
u = j ~--e 0~ (L9) 
o I--~ 
Household Budget Constraint 
K = rK + W-  C (I.10) 
First-Order Condition 
¢ 
-~ = #(r - 0) ( I . I I )  
Government 
Government Budget Constraint 
TyY + TpP = T,A + S (I. 12) 
Environmental Quality 
g = e(e) (IA3) 
Walras Law 
Goods-market quilibrium 
1 = Y -  S - A - C (!.14) 
Exogenous: To, Tp, S, K 0 
Endogenous: Y, P, A, V, D, I, W, C, T~, E, r, ~" 
Growth rate 
), £ .~ A C i i",. v b W 
~-Y-K -S -A -C- I -Tp  V I~=W 
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Notution 
Y = output K = capital stock 
S = public investment A = abatement spending 
P = pollution 1 = investment in private capital 
V= value of the firm D = dividends 
C = private consumption W= profits 
E = quality of the environment T, = tax on output 
T~ = abatement subsidy Tp = pollution tax 
r = interest rate ¢r = growth rate 
Parameters 
"q = environmental externality parameter in production 
6 = environmental externality parameter in utility 
o- = intertempora! substitution elasticity 
0 = pure rate of time preference 
o-  = substitution elasticity between private capital and public investment 
% = substitution elasticity between intermediates N = n(A,P) and M = m(K,S) 
Product ion funct ion 
We extend the product ion  technology in Bar ro  (1990) and  Bar ro  and  
Sa la- i -Mart in  (1992) by  inc luding pol lut ion,  abatement ,  and  env i ronmenta l  
qua l i ty  as inputs into product ion .  In part icu lar ,  by using product ion  
techno logy  0 .1 ) ,  f irms combine  thre ~ pr ivate inputs with two publ ic  inputs 
to  produce  output  (Y) (see f igure 1). On  the one  hand,  fo l lowing Bur ro  
(1990) and  Bur ro  and  Sala- i -Mart in  (1992), physical  capital  (K)  and  prod-  
uct ive government  spend ing  (S),  which can be thought  of  as in f rastructure,  
a re  combined to produce  an  intermediate  input ,  M. The  funct ion m(K,S)  
exhib i ts  constant  returns  to  scale with respect  to the two inputs.  On  the 
o ther  band,  by combin ing  pol lut ion (p)3 and  pr ivate abatement  (A) ,  f inns 
produce  another  in termediate  input ,  N. 4 The funct ion n(A ,P )  features  
constant  returns  with respect  o the man-made input of  abatemenL  which,  in 
cont ras t  o  the natura l  input o f  pol lut ion,  is g rowing  on  a ba lanced-growth  
path .  Together  with the publ ic  services f rom the env i ronment  (E)  s, the two 
3Alternatively, pollution can be modelled as an output (see, e.g., Van der Ploeg and 
WRhagen (1991), Gradus and Smulders (1993) and Smulders and Oradus (1995)). Sieben, 
Eichenberger, Gronych and Pethig 0980) show that these two modelling approaches are 
equivalent. In our model, pollution can be interpreted as a polluting input with zero extraction 
costs. Emissions are proportional to this input. 
Abatement isassumed to be a private input, which enables firms to increase output without 
causing more pollution. Other studies take abatement asa public, rather than a private, input 
(see e.g. Nielsen, Pedersen and Serenscn, 1995). In that case, abatement can be viewed as 
knowledge about "clean" production mctbods. 
s Pollution, P, can be viewed as the extractive, rival use of the environment. At the same 
time, the environment, E yields non-extractive, non-rival services as an input into production. 
A.L. Bovenberg, R.A. de Mooij / Journal of Public Economics 53 (1997) 207-237 213 
intermediate inputs, N and M, yield output (Y), where the production 
function f (M,N)  exhibits constant returns with respect o M and N. 
For balanced-growth to be feasible, the production function 
must meet a number of restrictions. 6 First, the production function must 
meet the core property by exhibiting constant returns with respect o the 
growing inputs: 
~+3+y=l  (2.1) 
where &/3 and 3' denote the production elasticities of the growing inputs S, 
K and A, respectively. 
The ~econd condition for balanced-growth is that the production elas- 
ticities of the various inputs at the leR-hand side (LHS) of (2.1), as well as 
the production elasticity of pollution (a3"), remain constant over time. This 
imposes restrictions on the substitution possibilities between the various 
inputs. In particular, on a sustainable growth path, the flow of pollution (P) 
is constant, while abatement (A) grows at the same rate as output. In the 
face of these diverging rowth rates, the production elasticities of pollution 
and abatement (i.e. a3" and 3`) remain constant only if the elasticity of 
substitution between the non-growing input, P, and ti~e growing input, A, 
equals unity. In particular, ff substitution would be too easy (i.e. the 
substitution elasticity > I), the production elasticity of pollution would 
approach zero as the growing input (abatement) would crowd out the 
non-growing input (pollution). If substitution would be too difficult (i.e. the 
substitution elasticity < 1), in contrast, the production elasticity of abate- 
ment would go to zero because the marginal product of abatement would 
fall substantially as the abatement-pollution ratio rises. For the same 
reasons, the elasticity of substitution between f (N ,M) ,  which grows on the 
balanced-growth path, and the quality of the environment, which remains 
constant, should equal unity. Finally, the substitution elasticity between K
and S, denoted by or ,  as well as the substitution elasticity between M and 
N, denoted by try, should be constant. However, these elasticities are 
allowed to differ from unity as the arguments in m and f (i.e. K, S and M, 
- 7 N, respecttvely) grow at the same constant rate. 
Firm behavior 
The model describes a decentralized conomy with perfect competition. A 
Smulders and Gradus (1995, sections 3 and 4) and Bovenherg and Smulders (1995. section 
3) formally derive the necessary conditions for balanced growth. 
7 If abatement would not enter the model, the substitution elasticity between (constant) 
pollution and the (growing) intermediate input, M, would he restricted to unity (see the 
analysis in section 3). Incorporating abatemenL thus enables us to examine alternative 
substitution possibilities. Section 4indicates that this is potentialy important. 
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y = f (M,N}~n 
f (M.N) E 
I o, I 
I on I I z i 
K $ g p 
Fig. I .  P roduct ion  st ructure.  
representative firm maximizes its value (1.2) with respect to abatement, 
pollution and investment. It ignores the environmental production externali- 
ty. The value of the firm amounts to the present value of all future 
dividends, represented by (I.3). Ty stands for a tax on output, T a represents 
an abatement subsidy and Tp denotes a pollution tax. The interest rate, 
denoted by ~', is constant on a balanced-growth path. We abstract from 
depredation of capital. Hence, the accumulation of capital (/~') equals gross 
investment (1) (see (I.4)). 
Profits (W) in (I.5) are defined as dividends plus investment minus capital 
costs. 8 Positive profits can exist in equilibrium due to the presence of a fixed 
factor (e.g., land, know how, managerial talent), which constitutes a barrier 
for entering firms. Solving the maximization problem of the firm, we find the 
implicit demand equations for private inputs (1.6), (1.7) and (1.8). These 
expressions reveal that firms equalize the marginal productivity of private 
inputs to their respective producer prices. 
Household Behavior 
A representative household maximizes an intertemporal utility function 
(1.9) subject to a dynamic budget constraint (I.10). Two arguments enter 
instantaneous utility: private consumption (C) and the quality of the 
environment (E). 
~Non-negative firm profits ( i .e.s. = ( ! -  T~)(~- ay)>~O) require that the production 
elasticity of pollution at the firm level (a~,) does not exceed the production elasticity of public 
investment (3). With production featuring constant returns with respect to the gro~'ing inputs, 
S, A and K (see (2.1)), the non-negativity condition for profits guarantees that he production 
function does not exhibit increasing returns with respect to the 'private" inputs P, ,4 and K. 
Merger across firms is thus not beneficial nd a competitive equilibrium can be sustained. 
Hence. perfect competition is possible only if public infrastructure enters the production 
function. 
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The substitution elasticity between the growing variable, C, and the 
quality of the environment, E, must be unity to ensure that baJanced 
sustainable growth is optimal from a social point of view. Intuitively, on a 
balanced growth path, optimal saving rates and the optimal demand for 
environmental services should not respond to output becoming more 
abundant relative to environmental quality. This requires that the elasticity 
of marginal utility UccC/Uc  be constant. Moreover, the positive income 
effect on the demand for environmental services, which is triggered by 
output growth, exactly offsets the negative substitution effect on account of 
a rising shadow price of environmental quality. If the substitution elasticity 
were smaller than unity, the income effect would dominate the substitution 
effect so that saving rates, and hence growth, would decline as produced 
goods become more abundant relative to environmental quality. If the 
substitution elasticity between C and E would exceed unity, in contrast, 
saving rates and hence growth rates would increase over time as the 
substitution effect would dominate the income effect. In that ease, produced 
goods would substitute for environmental menities in the long run so that 
these amenities would not be relevant for long-rnn utility (see Smulders and 
Gradus (1995) and Bovenberg and Smulders (1995)). 
Maximizing household utility subject o the household budget constraint, 
one finds the Keynes-Ramsey rule (I.11)? 
Government 
The government budget is balanced according to (I. 12). The government 
does not issue public debt and raises revenues by adopting a positive tax rate 
on output (Ty), which is constant on a balanced-growth path, and a positive 
tax rate on pollution (Tp), which grows at the same rate as output so as to 
keep constant the share of pollution tax revenues in output, i.e. T~, = T,,P/ 
Y. The revenues from these taxes are used to finance two types of 
government spending, which grow at the rate of output: public investment 
(S) and abatement subsidies (Ta). The government balances its budget at 
each point in time by adjusting the tax rate on output. 
9For the steady state to be meaningful, the consumption share of output should be 
non-negative. This condition ensures also that utifity is bounded. From 0.5) and 0.10), we 
know that s c = s~. On  a balanced-growth path, D is growing at a constant rate, or. Solving the 
integral (1.2), we derive: s~ =s,~ =(r-crD,. Hence. the growth rate, ~', should not exceed the 
interest rate. This condition restricts he rate of time preference (0) and the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution (o-). In particular, by using (I.11), we find that a r~q-aegative 
consumption share requires that: #o'+(1-o')r~>0. Hence, the intertemporal substitat/on 
possibilities cannot be too large, especially if the rate of time pleference is small. 
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Environmental Quality 
Relation (I.13) formalizes the inverse relationship between the quality of 
the environment and the flow of pollution, t° Environmental quality in the 
initial equilibrium is assumed to be well above a certain ecological threshold 
level. Environmental quality remains above this critical load because 
pollution does not grow on the balanced-growth path while the policy shocks 
we consider are infinitely small. 
Walrus Law: equilibrium conditions and budget constraints 
The model describes a closed economy. The equilibrium condition on 
(1.14) can be found by combining (1.3), (I.4), (1.5), (I.10) and (I.12) for 
dividends, investment, profits, the household budget constraint and the 
government budget constraint, respectively. 
Linearized model 
To solve the model, we log-linearize it around a steady state. Appendix A 
derives the log-linearized factor-demand equations, Table 2 contains the 
Iog-linearized model. Notation is explained at the end of the table. A tilde 
( - )  denotes a relative change, unless indicated otherwise. Relative changes 
in the growing variables are presented relative to the relative change in the 
capital stock and are presented as lower case variables. Hence, these 
variables represent relative changes of variables as a ratio to the capital 
stock (which is initially predetermined). For example, the change in the 
pollution tax, which is a growing variable, is given by ~ = T, - K. 
Expression (II.2) reveals that a higher relative price of pollution induces 
substitution from pollution towards other inputs. The strength of the 
substitution effect towards either abatement or capital depends on the 
magnitude of ~r. In particular, if o~ < 1 (as in section 4 below), substitution 
between the intermediate factors M and N is difficult relative to substitution 
l., Alternatively, the quality of the environment could be modelled as a stock rather than as a 
flow (see e,g. Bovenberg and Smulders (1995)). However, this would complicate the model 
substantially as it would imply a second state variable, thereby intrnducir~g transitional 
dynamics. More importantly, the qualitative steady-state results do not change if a stock, rather 
than a flow, determines the external effects (see Smulders and Gradus (1995), appendix A). 
Hence. if one is interested in long-term effects, the assumption f a flow of pollution involves 
no loss of generality. In more complicated models with stock-flow dynamics, issues of stability 
and existence of a steady state may arise (see Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1993)). However, 
stability and existence can be established in simple models that include nvironmental quality as 
a stock (see Bovenberg and Smulders (1994)). 
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between A and P. In that case, pollution and abatement are substitutes: a 
higher price for abatement increases pollution. However, if cry > 1, com- 
pared to other inputs, pollution is a poor substitute for abatement. 
Therefore, a higher relative price for abatement lowers pollution. Po|lution 
can be affected also by public investment. In particular, lower public 
investment raises pollution if cr m < cry. In that case, compared to capital, 
pollution is a better substitute for public investment. The demand for 
abatement rises with the level of pollution, abatement subsidies and 
pollution taxes (see (11.3)). 
Relations (II.7) and (II.8) reveal that the economy grows faster if and 
only if the interest rate increases. This is because a higher interest rate is 
associated with a higher after-tax return to capital, which stimulates avings 
and investment:  According to (II.9), consumption rises if profits increase. 
Consumption is affected also by the income and intertemporal substitution 
effects associated with changes in the interest rate. In particular, if the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (cr) exceeds unity, the intertempora| 
substitution effect dominates and consumption declines on account of a 
higher interest rate. 
Table 2 
The model in relative changes 
Output 
~7 = ~" + 3'~ + a3 '15 +~L" (I1.[) 
Pollution 
_ ~(,7~-,,,) - + , r (7 - i ' )  [ l+a( l -o ' ) iP= o. (8 + ,0) ~'- (I - o~,)(t~ + T~) 01.2) 
Abatement  
,~=P + ¢o+?,  III.3) 
Rate of return to capital 
8(,r - c, ) _ . 
f = ~( . (~-~"  + (i - ~,)-qE + or, iV + r,] (!i.4) 
Dividends 
s,,d = -s,/'+ (I - r~)lSf + ~?o - ¢, - a~'?p - ~P l  (11.5) 
H To  ensure that growth is positive in the initial equilibrium, we assume that the interest rate 
exceeds the pure rate of time preference in the initial equilibrium (see i. I 1 ). Since we consider 
only marginal changes in the tax system, growth remains positive after the tax reform. Hence, if 
irreversible investments would restrict he growth -ate to be non*negative, a boundary solution 
with zero growth could not occur. Fur an analysis of a model with negative growth, see 
Smulders and Gradus (1995). With negative growth, utility is declining over time. According to 
the terminology of Pezzey (1992), this implies that the economy is not sustainable. 
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Profits 
s~ = Sdd + s f -  rsk7 ([I.6) 
Growth rate 
~i  (117) 
Household savings 
- r ~ 
i= -~_o  r (11.8) 
Household budget constraint 
s~ '= s~ + (1 - cr)rskF (11.9) 
Government Budget constraint 
( t  - r , )T ,  + Ty  + r~7~ + r ;#  ; (1 - L)s . ,T. ,  + Ls~ + s..~" (It-10'~ 
Environmental Quality 
= _~/5 (!1.11) 
Goods-market equilibrium (Walras Law) 
s j=y-s ,c  s~a-s , s  (I1.12) 
Capital letters (X) denote levels of a variable, while lower-case variables (x) denote levels as a 
ratio of the capital stock (K), i.e. x = X/K  for x =y ,  s. a. tp, d, v, w.  i, c and ~7= ) ( - /¢ .  
Elasticities 
aY  aY  ~Y aY  
TEK o ~s  ~A T fe  ~ p _ 
lS=T,O=T.V . . . . .  >o  =T,O~3,= y ,E -  oP e 
Taxes 
~ dT .  dT ,  ~ dTp r.=~---y:. ~,=~-r?" r,=~- 
Shares 
% = A /Y  s ,=  D/Y  T* = T P tY  s = WIY  
• , = S /Y  5 c = C/Y  s ,  - I / Y  s k - K/Y  
s =V/Y  
Relations between the shares 
Dividends sa= (1 - T~) -  (1 - T~)s, - T*, - s  ; s d = ( r -  *r)s (SI)  
Profits s~ = Sa + 5, - -  r$  k = (1 - T~)(fi - aT)  ($2) 
Household Budget Constraint s.. - s~ + (r - *r)s~ ; s, = s a ($3) 
Definition of investment s. = ffs~ ($4) 
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Government Budget Constraint 
Goods-Market Equilibrium 
Production elasticities 
(1 - T~)V = (1 - T~) G 
(1 - L )~v  = T ;  
(1 - T,)/3 = rs, 
s, + "r¢~o = L + T~ (SS) 
s,= 1 - s , -G -s ,  ($6) 
(El) 
(E2) 
(E3) 
Welfare  
The welfare effects of small policy changes can be measured by the marginal 
excess burden. It amounts to the additional consumption that needs to be 
provided to the household to keep utility (after the policy shock) at its initial 
level. Hence, a negative value for the marginal excess burden corresponds 
to a rise in welfare. The marginal excess burden A-----dA/C amounts to (see 
appendix B): 
~SZss ~'+~Z ~" - -  ff (2.2) 
Sc -- $r r -  
All coefficients at the right-hand side (RHS) of (2.2) represer, t wedges 
between the marginal social costs and the marginal social benefits of an 
activity, if benefits exceed costs at the margin, an increase in such activity 
enhances welfare. For the growing variables A, S and K, expression (2.2) 
reveals that not only changes in current levels mat[er for welfare, but also 
the present value of future changes (indicated by the change in the growth 
rate). 
The first term at the RHS of (2.2) stands for the welfare effect of a change 
in pollution, which is a non-growing variable. First, as a private input into 
production, pollution exerts a positive effect on output, which is represented 
by oty. Second, by worsening environmental quality, pollution imposes an 
adverse production externality, captured by er/. The overall effect on 
productivity is positive only if a7 - er /> 0, i.e. if the positive output effect 
of additional pollution as a rival input for the individual firm exceeds the 
negative external (non-rival) productivity effect of aggregate pollution. 
Finally, pollution yields an adverse consumption externality (see the last 
term between the first square brackets). 
The second term at the RHS of (2.2) reveals that higher current or future 
abatement improves welfare if the output tax, which acts as an implicit tax 
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on abatement, exceeds the abatement subsidy. Hence, more abatement 
boosts welfare only if it is taxed on a net basis. ~z 
The partial welfare effect of higher public investment is captured by the 
third term at the RHS of (2.2). A rise in public investment improves welfare 
if the productivity effect of public investment exceeds the share of public 
investment in output. This condition implies that the marginal product of 
public investment is larger than unity, i.e. dY/dS  > 1 or, alternatively, that 
the marginal social benefits, dY, exceed the marginal social costs, dS. 
The last term at the RHS of (2.2) represents the welfare impact of 
marginal changes in the rates of capital accumulation. The tax on output 
drives a wedge between the before-tax return to capital (which stands for the 
marginal social benefits of capital accumulation) and the after-tax return to 
capital (which measures the marginal social costs of capital accumulation) so 
that the growth rate of capital is too low from a social point of view. 
Accordingly, a higher rate of capital accumulation (i.e. ~->0) improves 
welfare because the benefits in terms of higher future output exceed tile 
costs in terms of current consumption foregone. 
The double dividend discussion has focussed on tax distortions rather than 
spending distortions. Hence, we abstract from distortions associated with 
inefficient levels of public spending on infrastructure and abatement sub- 
sidies by setting T a = T~ and ~ =s~. Changes in abatement or public 
investment thus yield no first-order effects on welfare. This allows us to 
concentrate on the interaction between the environmental distortion (i.e. 
the first term at the RHS of (2.2)) and the tax wedge distorting rowth (i.e. 
the fourth term at the RHS of (2.2)). In particular, an environmental tax 
reform yields a double dividend if it not only cuts pollution but also 
alleviates the tax distortion by boosting growthJ 3 
3. Effects on growth, pollution and welfare 
This section explores the economic, ecological and welfare effects of 
higher pollution taxes (i.e. ~ > 0). Appendix C solves the model from table 
2 for the special case that abatement subsidies and the share of public 
investment spending in the capital stock remain constant (i.e. T~ = k'--0). 
This section discusses the results for a sub-production function f (N ,M)  of 
1., This is the partial effect. Abatement affects welfare also by impacting pollution. This 
indirect effect is represented bythe first te~m at the RHS of (2.2). 
~ if 6 ~s, and T > T,, growth would boost welfare not only by alleviating the tax distortion 
but also by reducing distortions due to inefficient levels of expenditure on infrastructure and 
abatement subsidies. In that case, we could talk about riple or quadruple dividends. 
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the Cobb-Douglas type (i.e. % = 1), 14 while section 4 examines the more 
general case in which % is allowed to differ from unity. 
Effects on growth and environment 
The reduced-form equations for the growth rate, pollution and the tax 
rate on output are given by: 
r l (,~/_ ~,))~ (3.1) 
~r r~O A 
~=_~ 1 
- ~ ((~y - e~)~ (3.2) 
L= Ss 
~- (a T - eB)i'p (3.3) 
where A _~ rs k + s~ - (a~ - erl) > 0] 5 
Expression (3.2) reveals that a pollution tax exerts two effects on 
pollution. First, pollution decreases proportionally due to input substitution 
(i.e. the first term at the RHS of (3.2)). Hence, the composition of economic 
activity becomes cleaner. Second, changes in the growth rate affect pollution 
(see (3.1) and (3.2)). On account of this growth effect, the level of economic 
activity changes. The overall effect on pollution is unamiguously negative. ~6 
The growth effect of an environmental tax reform depends on how such a 
reform impacts the after-tax rate of return, which determines the incentives 
to save according to the Keynes-Ramsey rule (I.11). The after-tax return, in 
turn, is determined by the before-tax of return (i.e. the marginal productivi- 
ty of capital) and the income tax rate. The net impact on the before-tax 
return depends on two offsetting effects. On the one hand, a higher 
pollution tax rate depresses the marginal productivity of capital by reducing 
the input of pollution. These costs of the pollution tax depend on the 
production elasticity of pollution, ay, which measures the importance of 
pollutio~ as a private input into production. On the other hand, the 
improvement in environmental quality associated with the drop in pollution 
I~The value of o- m does not affect the analysis because the ratio S/K is fixed. Hence, the 
sub-production function m(K,S) does not need to be Cobb Douglas. 
~ The determinant, ~, can be interpreted as the fraction of national income that flows to 
households. The first term indicates net income from the privately owned capital stock andfirm 
profits. The second term amounts to the net benefits from a lower level of pollution. The 
determinant should be positive for the equilbrium to be stable. 
to In particular, the coefficient for the pollution tax at the RHS of (3.2) can be rewritten as: 
l 1 [~ + ~( . , - ,~) ]  =-~ta  + (~, - .~)1 :1  -~l,s~ +s.l<O. 
Hence, pollution unambiguously falls. 
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enhances the productivity of inputs in production. These public benefits of a 
lower level of pollution increase with the environmental externality in 
production, 77~, and the elasticity that measures the effect of pollution on 
environmental quality, E. 
If a7 -  ~rl = 0, a higher pollution tax leaves the marginal product of 
capital unaffected as the private costs of less polluting inputs (represented by 
ay)  exactly offset the public benefits of a higher level of public environmen- 
tal services into production ( represented by ~rl). In this case, not only the 
before-tax return but also the after-tax return and hence the growth rate 
(see (3.1)) remain constant because the tax rate on output,/[~, is unaffected 
(see (3.3)). The distortionary tax rate must be kept constant because the 
higher pollution tax does not yield any additional public revenues: with a 
unitary substitution elasticity, Cry, the loss of revenue due to the erosion of 
the base of the pollution tax exactly matches the increase in revenues from 
the pollution tax due to the increase in the tax rate. Hence, the slope of the 
Laffer curve for the pollution tax is zero. 
The environmental tax reform harms growth if ay  - ~a? > 0. In this case, 
the after-tax return declines because of two reasons: a decrease in the 
before-tax return and an increase in the tax rate on output. The before-tax 
return to capital falls because the adverse input effect of lower pollution on 
the marginal productivity of capital dominates the favorable externality 
effect. The drop in the return to capital erodes the base of the output tax. 
Accordingly, with revenues from the pollution tax remaining constant, the 
government is forced to raise the tax rate on output in order to meet its 
revenue constraint. 
If a7 -  ¢~7 < 0, higher pollution taxes raise the before-tax return. The 
broadening of the base of the output tax allows for a reduction in the tax 
rate on output (see (3,3)), thereby ensuring that the after-tax return and 
thus growth rise. Hence, if the environmental externality in production is 
large, an environmental tax reform may boost not only the quality of the 
environment but also growth. Previous analyses of the double dividend issue 
(see e.g. Ulph (1992), B,_wenberg and De Mooij (1994ab) and Bovenberg 
and Van der Ploeg (1994ab)) have abstracted from productioo externalities 
(i.e. e~/= 0). In that case, a higher pollution tax always implies a net burden 
on the production sector and thus reduces growth as ~7 > 0. 
Welfare effects 
Armed with the economic and ecological effects, ;-~e now turn to the 
effects on welfare, defined by the marginal excess burden in (2.2). The 
welfare effects of pollution taxes depend on the effects on only pollution and 
growth (see (2.2) with T~ = Ty and 8 = s~). By substituting the reduced-form 
equations for growth and pollution, (3.1) and (3.2), into (2.2), we derive the 
following solution for the marginal excess burden: 
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rs, + s,  [ Ir r ] 1 a~,-e~/ 
(3.4) 
The first term at the RttS of (3.4) reveals that, by cutting the level of 
pollution, pollution taxes raise welfare by enhancing environmental 
amenities. Second, if a lower pollution level raises the after-tax return to 
capital (i.e. ay -  e'O < 0), pollution taxes enhance private or non-environ- 
mental welfare. This private component is captured by the second term at 
the RHS of (3.4). This term reveals that a higher after-tax return to capital 
boosts welfare by raising both (current) household income from capital and 
profits (first term between square brackets) and the growth rate. The welfare 
impact of changes in the growth rate depends on the wedge between the 
marginal social costs and benefits of capital accumulation, implied by the 
distortionary tax on output. 
If higher taxes on pollution raise the after-tax return to capital, they yield 
a double dividend by enhancing not only environmental menities but also 
productivity and growth and thus private welfare. If, however, the pro- 
duction externality (eT/) is smaller than the production elasticity (ay),  higher 
pollution taxes reduce the after-tax return to capital. In that case, a trade-off 
exists between, on the one hand, higher environmental menities and, on 
the other hand, lower economic growth and private welfare. 
Optimal pollution taxes 
The pollution tax is set at its optimal evel if a marginal change in its rate 
leaves welfare unaffected, i.e. ff the marginal excess burden is zero. In a 
first-best world where the government has access to lump-sum taxes, the 
optimal pollution tax is at the Pigovian level, which fully internalizes the 
environmental externalities in production and consumption (see (2.2) with 
Ty=0,  T a=0andS=s~) :  
~4' a~, - e~/ 0 (3.5) 
8¢ 
However, our model is not first-best. In particular, the governmem does not 
have access to lump-sum taxation to finance its public goods. To investigate 
whether, in this second-best world, the government still finds it optimal to 
set the environmental tax at its Pigovian level, we substitute (3.5) into (2.2) 
and arrive at: 
,~ Ty___BB ~. ~- (3.6) 
$c r - -  "/'/" 
Hence, if Ty > O, raising the pollution tax above its Pigovian level harms 
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welfare if it reduces the growth rate. Indeed, at the Pigovian tax the 
production elasticity of pollution exceeds the environmental externality in 
production if environmental menities are positive (i.e. (a3" - e~l/s~) = ~dp > 
0, see (3.5)). Hence, a higher pollution tax reduces the growth rate (see 
(3.1)). Intuitively, by internalizing the consumption externality of pollution, 
environmental taxes reduce the productivity of capital and, therefore, harm 
growth. This drop in growth produces a first-order loss in welfare, as capital 
accumulation features a gap between its marginal social costs and marginal 
benefits. 
These results demonstrate that pollution taxes aimed at internalizing 
environmental externalities may, as a side effect, exacerbate pre-existing 
distortions in the economy. Indeed, in a second-best world, the optimal tax 
on pollution differs from its first-best level. In particular, the optimal 
pollution tax lies below the Pigovian level. Bovenberg and De Mooij (1994a) 
reach similar conclusions when exploring the interaction between environ- 
mental and labor-market distortions. They argue that the optimal pollution 
tax lies below its Pigovian ievcl because pollution taxes exacerbate the 
distortion in the labor-market. 
4. Tax-Shifting 
Section 3 assumed a unitary substitution elasticity %, implying that 
substitution from pollution towards physical capital is relatively easy. In 
practice, environmental taxes with the most revenue potential involve 
energy use. Most empirical evidence suggests that substitution possibilities 
between energy inputs and capital are rather limited (see e.g. Berndt and 
Wood (1979), Pindyck (1979), Griffin (1981) and Hesse and Tarkka (1986)). 
In this section, therefore, we allow the substitution elasticity cry to be smaller 
than unity. Accordingly, pollution taxes imply less factor substitution and 
thus are more effective as a revenue-raising device. Moreover, compared to 
capital, abatement is a better substitute for pollution. This does better 
justice to the term abatement. 
Ef fects  on  growth  and  po l lu t ion  
The retraced-form equation for pollution amounts to (see appendix C): 
/5=- [1  (1 - crY)(1 -ATy)(1 - 3,)a ]~ trY(aYA, E~/) ~ p (4.1) 
where A* =- %I ts  k + s w - (ay  - ~n)] ~- ( 1 - %)(1 - Ty)( 1 - 3' )(1 + a ) > 0. 
I f  cry, equals unity, (4.1) is identical to (3.2). If substitution between the 
intermediate factors M and N becomes more difficult, pollution taxes are 
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less effective in cutting pollution, as they induce less substitution from 
pollution towards capital. Nevertheless, relation (4.1) re'~eals that pollution 
taxes always reduce pollution, even if cr approaches zero. t7 
The reduced-form for the tax rate on output is given by: 
~ s~ . (1  - %) (1  - T , ) (a  - ,n )av .  
Ty = ~ (ay - eTi)tp A* tp (4.2) 
This relationship reveals that if substitution between pollution and eapRal 
becomes more difficult (i.e. ~ry becomes maller), pollution ta~es are more 
efficient as a revenue-raising device. Indeed, even if pollution taxes involve 
a negative ffect on gross productivity (i.e. ay  - 6v/> 0), they may neverthe- 
less raise a positive amount of public revenues (which are used to cut the tax 
rate on output). 
The effect on the growth rate is given by: 
s i l l  = (ay  - ~¢l)P - swa '  (4.3) 
This expression reveals that the growth performance is affected by two 
factors, namely, first, the net costs of environmental policy borne by the 
production sector (i.e. the first term at the RHS of (4.3)), and, second, the 
part of the costs borne by profits (i.e. the second term at the RHS of (4.3)). 
As explained in section 3, a tighter environmental policy generates an 
adverse impact on growth if a lower pollution level implies a net burden on 
the production sector. This is the case if ay -  E*/> 0, i.e. if the negative 
output effect of a reduction in pollution as a private rival input exceeds the 
positive effects associated with less adverse production externalities. The 
second term at the RHS of (4.3) indicates the effect of shifting the tax 
burden away from the after-tax return towards profits. In particular, lower 
profits produce a higher growth rate. Intuitively, taxing away a larger share 
of profit income creates room to cut the distortionary tax rate on output (see 
(4.2)), thereby raising the return on capital accumulation. 
The reduced-form equation for profits is given by: 
~TThe coefficient a  the RHS of (4.1) can be cewritten as: 
x 1,1" - ( 1 - %)(1 - r , ) ( l  - ~,)a + e,(~y - ~)1 
1 
= --~-[cr (rs, + sw) ÷ (1 - a,)(t - L )0  - ~')l < 0. 
Hence, pollution unambiguously drops due to higher pollution taxes, even if % = 0. 
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~ s ,  ~ (1 -o -y ) (1 -T~. ) [a~, -an+rs~a]  
s .  w = - - -~  (as, - an)t ;  a* aft. 
(4.4) 
The first term at the RHS of (4.4) represents he effect of input substitution. 
It reveals that, through this channel, profits share in the burden of 
environmental policy on the production sector. In particular, pollution taxes 
harm profits if the adverse pollution externalities on production are small 
compared to the input share of pollution as a rival input (i.e. ay - aT > 0). 
The second term at the RHS of (4.4) shows the effect of shifting the tax 
burden away from the after-tax return on investment towards profits. If 
% < 1, the tax-shifting effect causes the replacement of output taxes by 
pollution taxes to raise the return on investment by reducing profits, thereby 
boosting growth. The overall effect on growth is positive if the aggregate 
burden of environmental policy on the prodaction sector is small (i.e. 
(ay - at/)/~ is small) and a large share of this burden can be shifted unto 
profits (i.e. • is large and negative). By substituting (4.1) and (4.4) into 
(4.3), we derive the following condition for pollution taxes to boost the 
growth rate: 
a T - ~r/< (1 - %.)T~ (4.5) 
o/ 
The left-hand side (LHS) of (4.5) represents he net burden of less pollution 
on the production sector. In particular, if ay - ~ /> 0, a decline in pollution 
hurts the production sector. The parameter a determines how effective 
pollution taxes are in cutting pollution. In particular, if a is large, pollution 
is an important factor of production relative to abatement (i.e. ~y is large 
relative to y). In that case, substantially owering pollution is not attractive 
for firms, as the marginal product of pollution is highly sensitive to the flow 
of pollution, ts 
The RHS of (4.5) shows the benefits of pollution taxes in terms of shifting 
the tax burden away from the return on investment towards profits. If 
cry = 1, the pollution tax and output tax imply the same relative burden on 
profits and the return on capital accumulation. Hence, an ecological tax 
reform does not imply a shift toward non-distortionary lump-sum taxation of 
profits. Accordingly, the tax-shifting effect exerts no positive effect on 
growth. If % < 1, however, compared to the output tax, the pollution tax is 
more effective in raising revenues without depressing the return to invest- 
ment. The reason is that the tax on pollution is a more effective instrument 
to tax away profits (and the quasi-rents from pollution, in particular). Thus, 
t8 In the extreme case that a goes to infinity, pollution is not affected by a rise in the 
pollution tax. Hence, the costs of pollution taxes, represented by the LHS of (4.5),  are zero. 
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compared to an output tax, a pollution tax incorporates a more importam 
lump-sum element. Accordingly, by using the revenues from the pollution 
tax to cut the distortionary tax on output (see (4.2)), the government shifts 
the tax burden away from the return on investment towards profits, thereby 
boosting rowth. 
On balance, an environmental tax reform stimulates growth if the positive 
effect of tax-shifting (which allows for a redaction in the wedge between the 
before- and after-tax return to capital) dominates the negative ffect of input 
substitution on gross productivity associated with more public consumption 
in the form of more environmental menities. Also Bovenberg and Van tier 
Pioeg (1994b) find that, if an e~vironmental t x reform shifts the burden of 
taxation from labor towards the rents from a fixed factor in production, it
may boost employment. Similarly, Bovenberg and De Mooij (1994b) 
demonstrate that environmental taxes can yield a double dividend, by 
expanding employment and improving the environmer,, if the burden of the 
public sector is shifted from workers towards transfer ecipients. 
Welfare effects 
In section 3 we found that, in the Cobb-Douglas case, the optimal 
pollution tax is always below the Pigovian tax in the presence of en- 
vironmental amenities. The reason is that lowering the pollution tax from 
the Pigovian level always boosts growth and, therefore, enhances welfare. If 
substitution is more difficult, the welfare effects of raising pollution taxes 
from its Pigovian level continues to be represented by (3.6). Hence, if 
pollution taxes succeed in raising growth, they improve welfare. Contrary to 
the Cobb-Douglas case, pollution taxes may indeed raise the growth rate if 
cry < 1, even if environmental menities cause the production elasticity to 
exceed the production externality (i.e. if ay - ~*/= ¢4~s c > 0, see (4.5)). This 
is because raising pollution taxes may improve the efficiency of taxation by 
shifting the tax burden from the return on investment towards profits. 
The smaller environmental menities are, the more likely it will be that a 
rise in pollution taxes from the Pigovian level stimulates growth and thus 
improves welfare. This can be seen by substituting the Pigovian rule (3.5) 
and relation (E2) at the end of table 2 to eliminate T~ and aT from (4.5): 
sc~&[1 -a ( l  - ~) ( l  - Ty)] < a(1 - cry)(1 - Ty)~r/ (4.6) 
With cry below unity, this inequality for growth to increase is met either if 
environmental menities are small compared to production externalities or if 
large values for a ensure that pollution does not fall much. 
228 A.L.  Bovenberg, R.A. de Mooij / lournal of Public Economics 63 (1997) 2(17-237 
So Conclusions 
This paper has explored the consequences of an environmental tax reform 
for economic growth, pollution and welfare in a second-best framework in 
which the government has to employ distortionary taxes to finance public 
spending. Our analysis uncovered two channels through which an en- 
vironmental tax reform may yield a double dividend, i.e. not only improve 
environmental quality but also boost non-environmental welfare by stimulat- 
•ng economic growth. The first channel, discussed in section 3, is a positive 
environmental externality in production associated with the role of the 
environment as a public production factor. Previous analyses of the double 
dividend issue ignored this channel by modelling the environment as a 
public consumption good rather than a public production factor. In that 
case, environmental policy always implied a net burden on the production 
sector of the economy, as the benefits accrued only to the household sector. 
~'F~..  - second channel ihrough which an environmental tax reform may 
boost growth is a shift in the tax burden away from the return on capital 
accumulation towards profits. In particular, section 4 showed that a 
pollution tax may improve the efficiency of the tax system as a revenue- 
raising device by taxing away the quasi-rents from pollution. This second 
channel operates only if substitution between pollution and other inputs is 
difficult so that the base of the pollution tax is rather inelastic. 
The role of the environmental tax as a lump-sum tax on rents suggests the 
importance of how environmental policy assigns property fights to the 
environmem. If the property fights would be assigned to pollutors, the 
quasi-rents from pollution would accrue to the owners of the firms rather 
than to the government. This would be the case if instruments were adopted 
that do not raise public revenues uch as freely issued tradable permits. 
Accordingly, a double dividend cannot occur if the environmental externali- 
ty in production is relatively small so thai a decline in pollution imposes a 
net cost on the production sector. If the government owns the environment, 
in contrast, it can use the revenues from the sale of this public resource (i.e. 
the revenues from pollution taxes or the auctioning off of pollution permits) 
to cut distortionary taxes. In this case, a tighter environmental policy implies 
a capital oss for profit earners if substitution away from pollation is difficult. 
Hence, part of the burden of environmental policy on the production sector 
is borne by profits rather than the after-tax return to investment. If the 
tax-shifting away from the after-tax return towards profits is large enough, 
an ecolog/cal tax reform may enhance growth, even if environmental policy 
implies a net burden on the production sector. 19 
t~ Nielsen, Pedersen and S¢rensen (1995) show that for this reason environmental t xes are a 
more efficient instrument toraise public revenues than freely issued tradable permits. 
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In a second-best world with both environmental distortions and tax 
distortions, the optimal environmental tax typically differs from the Pigovian 
level. We find that the role of the environment as a public production factor 
does not overturn the result derived by Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994a) 
that the optimal pollution tax is lower than the ?igovian tax. As long as the 
environment produces ome environmental menities as a public consump- 
tion good, the Pigovian tax exceeds the optimal pollution tax, which 
internalize~ the adverse pollution externalities on consumption. Intuitively, 
at the optimal tax level, the pollution tax reduces growth, thereby worsening 
distortions due to the absence of lump-sum taxation. However, we also 
demonstrated that the optimal environmental tax may exceed its Pigovian 
level if the government has no access to more direct ways to tax rents. 
Intuitively, in the absence of an explicit lump-sum tax on profits, the 
pollution tax acts an implicit way to tax rents. For the optimal environmen- 
tal tax to exceed the Pigovian level, the pollution tax should be rather 
ineffective in cutting pollution. In that case, the shifting of the burden of 
public spending and environmental menities to the owners of the firm 
offsets the costs of additional environmental menities, thereby alleviating 
the net burden on investors o that the after-tax return on investment, and 
with it growdl, rise. 
Appendix A: Linearizlng the factor demand equations 
We Iog-linearize the model around an initial equilibrium. A tilde (-) 
above a variable denotes a relative change, unless indicated otherwise. 
Specification of F 
F =f (M,N)  is homogenous of degree 1 in M and N. Hence, FiM =f ( l ,N /  
M)--* d' = &(z) where tb = F/M and z = N/M. The first-order derivatives of 
F are: 
OF 
ON = 4~' (A1) 
OF 
aM = ~ - z4 , '  (A2)  
The substitution elasticity between M and N is defined as: 
[ OF/aN x N 
N OF~aN - dp' ~b-z~'  (A3) 
~ a -~ OF/OM 
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Specification o f  M 
M = m(K ,S)  is homogenous of degree 1 in K and S. Hence, M/K = m(1, 
S/K)- -> It = it(s) where i t  = M/K  and s = S /K .  The  first order derivatives of 
M are: 
OM 
aS = it' (A4) 
aM 
OK = it - s i t '  (A5) 
The substitution elasticity between K and S is defined as: 
[ OM/OS "X S 
1 ~--M-~-£) ~ -sit" it 
~-m-~= S aM/a~-  it' I t - s i t '  (A6) 
a-~ UMiaK  
From the definitions of the production elasticities, the Cobb-Douglas 
specification of N and (A4) and (A5), we derive: 
0ra  [0F__N][0NA__] 0FN 
Y-  aA Y - LaN F JLaA N J  =~-~--~* 1 (A7) 
OY K ors  Oe MrOM K OM S l 
t~+a=-~-¥+ as "," OM e [-~-~+-~--~J 
oF M 
0M F*  1 (A8) 
Homogeneity of F and M and using (A7) and (A8) implies: 
f = y/V + (~ +/3)11,t =/V + (6 +/3)[/Q -/V] (A9) 
M = ~-+ ~/~ + ~--~--~ S (AIO) 
where we have used (2.1). 
Specification o f  N and Y 
The Cobb Douglas specification for N implies for the relative change in 
N: 
/V = A + al 5 (Al l)  
Moreover, the externality of pollution specified in (1.1) implies for the 
relative change in Y: 
9 = F +ng (AI2) 
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Linearizing marginal factor productivity 
Armed with this set of definitions and relations, we are able to Iog- 
linearize the factor demand equations (I.6), (I.7) and 0.8) for abatement, 
pollution and capital, respectively. The relative change in the marginal 
product of abatement is derived by using (AI), (A3) and the Cobb Douglas 
specification of N in the production function (I.1): 
AaY laA  AOF/aN ~ AaN/aA 1 
aY/OA - ~ +*IE + ON/aA try 
The linearized marginal product of pollution is found by using the same 
relations as for abatement: 
A[a/F/OP]E ~ _ AOF/aN + ~ff~ + AON/OP 1 
ag /aP  OF~aN aNlaP try 
x (/3 + a ) [N-  M]  +,4 - ( l  - a)/5 + 7/E (Al4) 
To derive an exprcssion for the relative change in the marginal product of 
capital, we use (A2), (A3), (A5), (A6) and thc specification of the 
production function (I.l): 
AnY~OK _ AaF/OM +,lff~ + AaM/aK 1 
OY/OK OF~aM aM~OK % 
I ~ - 
x TIN -/i4] + ~--~ --+-'-~ [S -/~1 +hE (A15) 
Linearizing factor demand equations 
Using (A13), we linearize the demand for abatement (I.6) as: 
-~(/3 + ~ )IN -AI]  - a/~ - ~7/~" = L - L (A16) 
From (AI4), we arrive at the following linearized demand for pollution 
(1.7): 
1 
try (/3 + ~5 )IN -/14] + A - (1 - a)/; + "q/~ = Tp + T~. (A17) 
By adding (A16) and (AIT), we find the following relation between 
abatement and pollution: 
,4 =/~ + Tp + T. (A18) 
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Combining (A10) and (A18), we derive for abatement and pollution: 
..~ = 1----~ N + 1--~a [Tp 4~ 2~] (AI9) 
1 ~ 1 - 
/~  = ~ N - ~ IT. + T,] (A20) 
Finally, (A15) and (1.8) yield for the desired demand for capital: 
1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
T IN-  + - + = + Ty (A21) M] IS K] */E r 
Now we are able to derive the factor-demand equations as presented in 
table II. First, the rate of return to capital (II.4) is found by substituting 
(Ag), (A10) and (A12) into (A21) to eliminate N, M and F, respectively. 
Second, relation (II.2) for pollution is found by substituting (AI0) and (A11) 
into (A16) to eliminate N and M, and then using (II.4) to eliminate Y. 
Finally, (11.3) is equivalent with (A18). 
Append ix  B :  We l fa re  E f fec ts  
This appendix derives the marginal excess burden as a measure for 
changes in social welfare. It represents the welfare changes due to various 
policy measures in terms of consumption. 
Utility is defined in (I.9). On the sustainable balai~ced-growth path private 
consumption grows at a constant rate, ~t, while pollation remains constant. 
Hence, we can rewrite utility as: 
tc,,E°l' f e[o(, t)q'd, (B1) U 1 
1 - - -  0 
or 
where C o is the initial consumption level. To solve the integral at the RHS 
of (B1), we require that ~r(1 - 1 /o ' ) -0  <0 so that that utility Js bounded. 
Using (1.11) from table I, we rewrite this condition as follows: 
(5) O-~r  1 -  =r -~r>0 (B2) 
Solving the integral in (Bl) yields the following expression for utility: 
l 
[c0E~I ' ; 
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For utility to remain constant after a policy shock, we need: 
OU ~U OU 
0= dU =-~dC ÷ -~dE + -~-~ dlr (B4) 
The derivatives at the fight-hand side of (B4) can be derived by differentiat- 
ing (B3) with respect o the respective arguments. This yields: 
0u [c,,E'I' ~ - 
0C dC - r - 7r C (B5) 
I 
ou [C,,E*I'-: ,~g (s6)  
-~" dE = r -  ~r 
1 
OU [c .e* ] ' -~  
-~  dlr = r - Ir r -~  ~" (BT) 
Substituting (B5), (B6) and (B7) into (B4), we arrive at the following 
expression for the change in welfare: 
where ,~ = idA/C) is the additional consumption that needs to be provided 
to the household in order to keep utility, after the policy shock, at its initial 
level. It is denoted as the marginal excess burden. 
To arrive at an alternative formulation for the marginal excess burden in 
(B8), we substitute (11.1) into (II.12) to eliminate consumption. Thus, we 
find: 
, f=- ,k /~-  ¢r ~. 6 -s t _  y -sa~ ay -~ - s -  a -  15 + s-Z~ i " (B9) 
r -- ~rr S c S c S c S c 
To rewrite (B9), we first substitute (II.11) into (B9) to eliminate/~,. Then we 
use the production elasticity (El)  at the end of table II to rewrite the 
coefficient for abatement. By using (II.7), we can eliminate i. Finally, by 
using the relations between the shares ($2) and ($6), the production 
elasticity (E3) and relation (2.1), we derive the following relationship: 
(r - "rr)s k = s~ - (8 - s~) - (7 - sa)  - tyf l  (B10) 
Using (BI0) and ($2), we can rewrite the coefficient for growth in the 
marginal excess burden (B9) as in (2.2). 
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Appendix C: Solution of the model 
This appendix solves the model of tabl~ ll for the case the government 
uses T~. to balance its budget (ex post). We assume that 6 = s,, T, = T,. and 
T, = S = 0. This appendix makes extensive use of the relations between 
shares and the definitions of the production elasticities at the end of table ll. 
By substituting (II.3) and (I I . l l)  into (II.1), we can write output as: 
Then we substitute (C1) into (lI.4) to eliminate .)7 and use. ( l [ . l l )  to 
eliminate E. This yields: 
o-.F= [T + aT - o"¢~'r/]/~ + Y}'e - ~,.[,. (C2) 
Substitution of (C2) into (11.2) to eliminate F, we arrive at the following 
relation: 
[(1 - y)(1 + a) + o;(, n - ,~)l f + ,~,f, = - ( 1  - ~'V,, (C3) 
By substituting ff and ff from (C1) and (11.3) into the government budget 
constraint (lI.1O), we find another expression for fi and T, in terms of the 
exogenous variables: 
[aT - L~n IP  + (1 - L)T,, : -T*tfp (C4) 
Relations (C3) and (C4) form two linear equations in two endogenous 
variables. Rewriting them in matrix notation yields: 
k o~v (1 - y)(1 + or) + o-,(erj - a) \ - (1 -7 ) ]  
Solving this linear system by inverting the matrix at the left-hand side of 
(C5), we find: 
A, (  ~.) = ( (1 -7 ) ( l  + a) + (r, ' (~ - a) 
-% 
where: 
(c6~ 
a* = (1 - T,.)(I - T)( l  + ~,) - ~,.[aV - e,1 + (l - L )a ]  
=%[rsk +s , - - (aT -~) l+(1 -o~. ) (1 -T , . ) (1 - , / ) ( l+a  ) (C7) 
The determinant in (C7) should be positive for the equilibrium to be stable. 
(C6) yields the reduced-form equations for the output tax and pollution: 
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a*L  = ++(~v - +,7)~,, - (t - ~0  r~(~, - ,~)?p (Cg) 
A*P  = -[rsk + swli'p - (1 - o~)T~ 
= a% + ( t  - ,~, ) ( l  - L ) (1  - ~ , )~ - ~ , ( ,~  - ~n)i', ( c9)  
Substituting (C3) into (II.2) to eliminate /~, we find for the interest rate: 
(c10) 
In order to find the reduced form for the interest rate we substitute (C8) into 
(C10). After some tedious algebra, we find: 
a* ;= -(~_~, - +n)~ + ( l  - o53(1 - L )~- r~ (e f t )  
The reduced form for the growth rate is closely related to (Cl l) (see (II.7) 
and (II.8)). The reduced form for the marginal excess burden can be derived 
by substituting the reduced forms for pollution and growth into (2.2). 
In order to gain more insight into the effects of pollution taxes on the 
interest rate, we derive another expression for ~'. By substituting 01.5) into 
(ll.6) to eliminate d, we find for profits: 
s..+ = - (1  - Z,.)[7~,. + ay~ + ,.q/5 + ~r  -+] (C12) 
Substituting (C4) into (C12) to eliminate ~. and rearranging terms, we find 
the following expression for the interest rate: 
( 1 - T~)flF= (ay - e.q)/5 _ s~ff (C13) 
The reduced form for profits is derived by substituting ((29) and (C11) into 
(C13). 
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